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Many criminal justice systems incapacitate potentially dangerous of-
fenders following the completion of their deserved sentences. Modes
of incapacitation include lengthy prison sentences, recidivist statutes,
and the post-sentence commitment of sexually violent predators.
These efforts, however, are unjust in that they imprison many offend-
ers long after their so-called "debt to society" has been paid and their
dangerousness has passed. A just society should imprison more accu-
rately.
Professor Paul H. Robinson' legitimately criticizes the use of the
criminal justice system for incapacitating dangerous criminals beyond
their deserved sentences. He argues that incapacitation is wholly in-
compatible with retribution or 'just deserts." Therefore, he pro-
poses first, tying prison sentence length to desert and second, using a
post-sentence civil commitment system to incapacitate dangerous
criminals.4
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2 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as CriminalJus-
tice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1429 (2001) ("[T]he trend of the last decade-the shifting of the
criminal justice system toward the detention of dangerous offenders-is a move in the wrong
direction. The difficulty lies not in the laudable attempt to prevent future crime but rather in
the use of the criminal justice system as the vehicle to achieve that goal.").
Id. at 1440; see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., Au-
gustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887) (explaining that punishment may never be justified
solely by society's aims; instead, that it may "be imposed only because the individual on whom it
is inflicted has committed a Crime"); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)
("Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who re-
ceive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.").
4 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1454 ("[T]he conflict betweenjustice and prevention can be
avoided by simply segregating the two functions into two systems.").
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Professor Robinson's reliance on dangerousness as the sole crite-
ria for civil commitment, however, raises many constitutional ques-
tions and is socially unpalatable. It is possible, instead, to use the ex-
isting parole structure to effectively and constitutionally achieve
Professor Robinson's proposed goal of segregating desert from inca-
pacitation. Following the portion of the sentence which an offender
deserves, parole should be utilized to regularly assess the offender and
effectuate his release from prison when he is no longer dangerous.
Part I of this article examines Professor Robinson's proposed post-
sentence civil commitment system for incapacitating dangerous of-
fenders. Part II addresses the constitutionality of this proposed
commitment based on dangerousness alone. Part III proposes pa-
role, rather than civil commitment, as a system to reconcile the justi-
fications of incapacitation and desert. Part IV argues that a parole
system, if properly utilized with a 'just deserts" sentencing approach,
most effectively and accurately incapacitates dangerous criminals.
I. PUNISHING DANGEROUSNESS
A. The Conflict Between Punishment and Incapacitation
Professor Robinson first questions the legitimacy of incapacitation
as a justification for punishment: "[T] he use of the criminal justice
system as the primary mechanism for preventing future crimes seri-
ously perverts the goals of our institutions ofjustice. ' '5 He emphasizes
the incompatibility of dangerousness, which is a "prediction of a fu-
ture wrong," and desert, which "arises from a past wrong., 6 For ex-
ample, a mentally ill offender is dangerous, but he may not deserve
5 Id. at 1434. Other commentators, however, justify incapacitation as achieving the utilitar-
ian goal of specific prevention. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 2.03[B] [2] (2d ed. 1995) (describing incapacitation as one of the forms of utilitarianism in
criminal law); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336,
1340-41 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (describing incapacitation as a generally regarded utili-
tarian theory of punishment intended to put "criminals out of general circulation"). Some
commentators employ the label "consequentialism" instead of "utilitarianism." See Stephen J.
Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 444 (discussing con-
sequenualism as compared to retributivism).
However, some commentators distinguish punishment aims from sentencing aims. See Ew-
ing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.") (emphasis added); ANDREW
ASHWORTH, Sentencing Aims, Principles, and Policies, in SENTENCING AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 57, 67
(2d ed. 1995) (distinguishing punishment from sentencing and placing incapacitation in the
latter category).
6 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1438; see also id. at 1441 ("The point is that the traditional prin-




criminal blame. A system predicated on incapacitation, however,
would imprison a mentally ill offender for his dangerousness despite
his blamelessness (lack of desert).
Currently, the American legal system incapacitates mentally ill of-
fenders by committing them to mental hospitals. However, such civil
commitment is not the exclusive manner of incapacitation in our le-
gal system. Instead, the two systems overlap; incapacitation occurs in
both prison and mental hospitals because offenders in either system
are separated from society. Depicted as a Venn diagram, the mental
hospital would fit only into the non-overlapping section of the circle
representing pure incapacitation."
In addition, Professor Robinson argues that a system of incapaci-
tation would set prison terms according to a prediction of future
criminality.9 Such a system, he explains, is "offensive to a system of
just punishment. A person does not deserve more punishment for an
offense because he has a poor employment history, is young, or has
no father in the household." °
A system of incapacitation is incompatible with a pure system of
desert-based (retributive) punishment. Yet, this does not prove that
desert-based punishment is exclusively valid, or that incapacitation
7 Id. at 1438.
8
De rt F-= prison
ncapa- atio E = mental hospital
9 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1439.
10 Id. at 1440. In fact, Virginia uses just such a system. Sentencing guideline worksheets for
rape and other forms of sexual assault include the offender's age, education, and employment
in computing the offender's sentence. See, e.g., Va. Criminal Sentencing Comm'n, Rape Sen-
tencing Guidelines Worksheet (July 1, 2002), http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheets/
worksheets2002/Rape2002.pdf (illustrating how to compute the 3entencing "score" for a rape
conviction). Sentencing factors for fraud, larceny, Schedule I & II drugs, and other drugs in-
clude the offender's gender, age, employment, and marital status. See, e.g., Va. Criminal
Sentencing Comm'n, Fraud Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet (July 1, 2004), http://
www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheet_2004/Fraud%20'Wkst%20.pdf (computing the sentencing
"score" for a fraud conviction).
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004) (implementing the discretionary use of "sen-
tencing guidelines worksheets"); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN
VIRGINIA 25 (2002), http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk-off-rpt.pdf (discussing the development
of Virginia's risk assessment instrument based on a study that identified specific factors corre-
lated with repeat offending, including juvenile behavior and delinquency); Emily Bazelon, Sen-
tencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 2, 2005, at 18 (describing Virginia's 2002 sentenc-
ing laws, which tie the length of sentence to a prediction of future dangerousness). In response
to Virginia's sentencing laws, Professor Robinson remarked, "[i]f you're punishing people be-
cause of a bunch of factors that have nothing to do with blame, well, you're not in the business
of doingjustice anymore." Id.
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cannot exist as a justification for punishment. Instead, it simply reaf-
firms their concomitant existence.
B. Segregating Incapacitation
In order to segregate punishment from incapacitation, Professor
Robinson proposes a post-sentence civil commitment system." If an
offender is still dangerous following his sentence, he would be com-
mitted to a facility to hold him until he is deemed safe to rejoin soci-
ety. He remains in confinement, albeit in the (theoretically) less pu-
nitive setting provided by the civil commitment system. In addition,
the periodic review mechanism traditionally built into the civil com-
mitment system can ensure a "sentence" of duration determined by
dangerousness." This flexible duration ensures the greater goal: fol-
lowing his deserved imprisonment, the offender should be incapaci-
tated only as long as necessary to protect society.
II. COMMITMENT FOR DANGEROUSNESS: CONSTITUTIONALITY
The state is unarguably empowered to utilize three manners of
civil incapacitation: civil commitment, commitment following acquit-
tal by reason of insanity, and sexually violent predator commitment. 13
Each of the these typically presupposes some type of mental illness or
defect before permitting confinement. Professor Robinson, however,
proposes the civil commitment of dangerous individuals. Therefore,
jurisprudence surrounding these three domains must be examined
for applicability to the civil commitment of non-mentally ill, but dan-
1 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1454. Earlier commentators have also argued for the detention
of the dangerous. See, e.g., Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 630, 639 (1938) ("Society has a right to isolate, not only an actual criminal, but
also, anyone who can be conclusively shown to be a potential criminal.").
12 But cf Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026
n.5 (2002) (responding to Professor Robinson's proposal by stating that such a scheme would
not lead to earlier release than current prison terms and that civil commitment is not likely to
be less punitive than prison). Furthermore, Professor Morse supposes that if commitment for
dangerousness alone is acceptable, it will be generally used, with no prior conviction or sen-
tence required. See id. ("If the civil commitment is preventive confinement based on future
dangerousness alone ... there is no need to rely on prior conduct at all.").
13 Many cases also speak to the procedural requirements of such commitment schemes. See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499-500 (1980) (requiring a hearing, though not necessarily
judicial, and counsel, though not necessarily legal, before transferring a prisoner to a mental
hospital); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (ruling that a hearing is not necessary to in-
voluntarily commit a minor to a mental hospital); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)
(requiring a burden of proof "greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence" to involuntarily
commit an individual to a state mental hospital). Because Professor Robinson does not address
the procedural aspects of his scheme, it is unnecessary to analyze these cases. Presumably, the
commitment of NMID individuals would conform to such precedent.
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gerous individuals (henceforth, "NMID"). Such a commitment
scheme, while arguably desirable, presents a constitutional challenge.
A. Civil Commitment
Kenneth Donaldson was committed to a Florida State Hospital in
1957 and held for fifteen years. 4 He had never been a danger to
himself or others.5  The Supreme Court, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
declared that a state may not "constitutionally confine ... a nondan-
16gerous individual" on the grounds of his mental illness alone . The
civil confinement of the non-dangerous mentally ill is thus prohib-
ited. The instant issue, the commitment of non-mentally ill, but dan-
gerous individuals, however, is the opposite of the class decided upon
in Donaldson.'
7
Four years after its decision in Donaldson, the Court announced in
Addington v. Texas that the burden of proof in civil commitment pro-
ceedings must be higher than a preponderance of the evidence.
The case confined its discussion to the burden of proof;' 9 Addington
never stated the constitutionally required criteria for civil commit-
ment. Nonetheless, the decision has frequently been interpreted to
14 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975).
15 Id. at 567.
16 Id. at 576.
17 Because O'Connor v. Donaldson decided the case of a mentally ill individual, it demon-
strates only that danger is required for confinement. Though there is no explicit holding, the
Court has logically stated that Donaldson "held ... it was unconstitutional for a State to continue
to confine a harmless, mentally ill person." Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992); see also
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990) (drawing the same conclusion as Foucha); Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) (drawing the same conclusion as Foucha).
Donaldson did not present the opportunity to rule on the commitment of a non-mentally ill,
but dangerous individual, as Professor Robinson proposes. Donaldson has, however, been more
recently interpreted to require both mental illness and dangerousness. See, e.g., Cooper v. Okla-
homa, 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996) ("[Olur decision in Donaldson makes clear that due process
requires at a minimum a showing that the person is mentally ill and either poses a danger to
himself or others or is incapable of 'surviving safely in freedom."' (citing Donaldson, 422 U.S. at
573-76)).
If this latter interpretation of Donaldson is correct-that both mental illness and dangerous-
ness are required to hold an individual in the civil context-then Donaldson represents an out-
right dismissal of post-sentence civil commitment for dangerousness alone.
Federal appellate decisions since Cooper, however, have generally followed Donaldson's origi-
nal meaning, not the interpretation in Cooper. See, e.g., Kerman v. City of NewYork, 374 F.3d 93,
110-11 (2d Cir. 2004) (relying on Donaldson for the proposition that the commitment of a non-
dangerous individual is prohibited); Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897, 910 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The
Due Process Clause prohibits a state from involuntarily committing an individual unless he is a
danger to himself or others."). But seeJensen v. Lane County, 312 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
2002) (interpreting Donaldson according to the Cooper understanding of its holding).
Is 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
19 Id. at 419-20 ("The question in this case is what standard of proof is required... in a civil
proceeding.., to commit an individual involuntarily... to a state mental hospital.").
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require mental illness and dangerousness as constitutional criteria for
commitment.
20
The Court has not had an opportunity to address the case of a
civil commitment of an NMID offender. This follows logically be-
cause a non-mentally ill individual would likely be immediately re-
leased from a mental hospital setting. If, however, the Donaldson and
Addington decisions are interpreted as criteria-defining cases, then the
Court need not discover an opportunity to address such a case. The
decisions' criteria for civil commitment, if they may validly be read as
such, require both mental illness and danger.' Thus, Professor Rob-
inson's proposed civil commitment of NMID individuals would be
unconstitutional. However, since this author argues that they are not
criteria-defining cases (despite their common interpretation as such),
further constitutional jurisprudence must be examined.
B. Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity
A state has an obvious interest in imprisoning dangerous criminal
offenders. Acquittals by reason of insanity, however, present a chal-
lenging scenario. The offender is not imprisoned; instead, state
20 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 550 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In Addington v.
Texas we held that a State could not civilly commit the mentally ill without showing by 'clear and
convincing evidence' that the person was dangerous to others.") (citations omitted); Foucha,
504 U.S. at 86 (citing Addington for the proposition that "in civil commitment proceedings the
State must establish the grounds of insanity and dangerousness permitting confinement by
clear and convincing evidence"); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) ("[In Adding-
ton] the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment
proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill
and dangerous.").
Similar to Donaldson, described supra note 17, if Addington mandates mental illness and dan-
gerousness as criteria for civil commitment, then the decision stands as a prohibition of post-
sentence civil commitment for dangerousness alone. The issue of civil commitment criteria was
not, however, before the Court, nor is there a clear holding in the opinion. Furthermore,
Addington has not consistently been interpreted as a criteria-mandating decision. See Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (using Addington for the proposition that the "Due Process
Clause allows civil commitment of individuals shown by clear and convincing evidence to be
mentally ill and dangerous") (emphasis added); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49
(1987) (citing Addington for the proposition that "the government may detain mentally unstable
individuals who present a danger to the public") (emphasis added).
21 State statutes regarding civil commitment criteria uniformly require both mental illness
and dangerousness. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1998) (requiring mental
illness and danger for ongoing confinement in a mental hospital); OR. REV. STAT § 426.005
(2005) (requiring chronic mental illness and danger to self or others).
22 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1137 (1985)
(explaining that the insane "cannot fairly be blamed" because they lack rationality). But see
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 110 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (arguing for the confinement of insanity acquit-
tees even after they have regained their sanity).
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statutes require immediate commitment to a mental hospital. In
many cases, the criminally insane offender continues to satisfy the
traditional civil commitment criteria: mental illness and dangerous-
ness. However, the dichotomy of the circumstances-that insanity is
a retrospective examination of the offender's sanity at the time the
crime was committed, 4 but commitment is a present evaluation of
mental competency-presents a scenario very similar to the instant
issue: the state's interest in holding non-mentally ill, yet dangerous
offenders.
From an equal protection viewpoint,5 one might expect the insan-
ity-acquittees to be in the same position as ordinary citizens. Neither
group has been adjudicated guilty, nor sentenced. Thus, one might
expect that their commitment should be subject to the same criteria
as civil committees, which, according to the standards apparently set
forth in Donaldson and Addington, require both mental illness and
dangerousness. 26  In fact, the Court has repeatedly distinguished
these two classes.2 7 Therefore, because post-insanity acquittal com-
mitment may permit the incapacitation of NMID individuals, its ju-
risprudence must be considered.
In Jones v. United States, the Court examined the case of a shop-
lifter acquitted by reason of insanity. He was committed to a mental
23 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-33 (1997) (requiring petition for continuing commitment
following an adjudication of "not guilty by reason of insanity"); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(b)
(2004) (mandating immediate commitment following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insan-
ity); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (West 2005) (requiring the trial court, following an insan-
ity verdict, to conduct a hearing to determine if the person is subject to commitment). See gen-
erally Samuel Jan Brakel, After the Verdict: Dispositional Decisions Regarding Criminal Defendants
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 184 n.l (1988) (finding ten states and
the District of Columbia with such commitment processes).
24 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 7.1 (2d ed. 2003) (survey-
ing the insanity defense); 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173 (1984) (provid-
ing an overview of the insanity defense).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
26 See supra Part II.A.
27 See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that in "conflat[ing] the
standards for civil and criminal commitment," the majority inappropriately applies Donaldson
and Addington to a criminal context); Id. at 108 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Unlike civil commit-
tees, who have not been found to have harmed society, insanity acquittees have been found in a
judicial proceeding to have committed a criminal act."); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
367 (1983) (asserting that the petitioner, having been acquitted by reason of insanity, could not
rely on Addington because of the "important differences between the class of potential civil-
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees"). But see Foucha, 504 U.S. at 84-85
(White, J., minority portion of the opinion) (arguing that by the Equal Protection Clause, now
sane, recovered insanity acquittees should be treated the same as civil committees). Justice
White attracted only three additional votes for this proposition.
28 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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hospital and remained there for almost ten years. 9 The Court de-
cided the question of whether Jones "must be released because he
ha[d] been hospitalized for a period longer than he might have
served in prison had he been convicted."30 The Court declined to re-
quire his release.3
The Court went on to declare that an offender may be held in "a
mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is
no longer a danger to himself or society. 3 2 While such a holding
prohibits the commitment of NMID individuals, this was neither the
posture before the Court, nor the question presented. Justice Tho-
mas later remarked: "We specifically noted in Jones that no issue re-
garding the standards for the release of insanity acquittees was before
us.
3 3
Nearly a decade later, the Court examined the case of Foucha v.
Louisiana.34 Terry Foucha was charged with burglary and illegal dis-
charge of a firearm, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and com-
35mitted to a mental hospital. Four years later, the hospital recom-
mended his release, seeing no sign of mental illness since his• • 36
admission. A trial court ruled, however, that Foucha should remain
in the mental hospital due to his danger to himself and others, de-
spite his sanity.37  The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, distin-
guishing Jones and permitting commitment "based on dangerousness
alone."
3'
29 See RALPH SLOVENKO, LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 943 (2002) (examining the case of Michael
Jones and its outcome); see also Consumer Finds Services Helpful: Road to Stability Bumpy but Success-
ful, CONNECTING (D.C. Department of Mental Health, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 2,
http://dmh.dc.gov/dmh/lib/dmh/pdf/an-Feb-04-Newsletter.pdf (profiling Michael Jones,
who, as of 2004, was still receiving mental health services from Washington, D.C., almost thirty
years after his insanity plea); Jamie Talan, Trapped in System: 20 Years in Psych Facilities Follow Teen
Insanity Plea, NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 2001, at A5 (recounting another nearly twenty year commit-
ment to a mental hospital following an insanity plea, as a seventeen-year-old, after robbing a
thirteen-year-old of two dollars).
30 Jones, 463 U.S. at 356.
31 Id. at 370. Jones was decided on the heels of John Hinckley's insanity acquittal following
his attempted assassination of then-President Reagan. The Jones decision may have been an at-
tempt to assuage the public's outcry over his acquittal. See Editorial, Instead, Prove Insanity, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 6, 1983, at A22 (suggesting that the Jones decision may help to quell the public pro-
test); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Surely, the citizenry would not
long tolerate the insanity defense if a serial killer who convinces a jury that he is... insan[e] is
returned to the streets immediately after trial ...
s2 Jones, 463 U.S. at 370.
33 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 120 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citingJones, 463 U.S. at 363 n.l).
34 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
35 Id. at 73-74.
36 Id. at 74.




The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying on O'Connor v.
Donaldson, Addington v. Texas, and Jones v. United States for the propo-
sition that commitment requires both mental illness and dangerous-
ness.3 9 The Court further distinguished United States v. Salerno, which
permits confinement for dangerousness alone, though only for the
limited time prior to trial.40  Because Foucha was not mentally ill,
even though he was dangerous, the Court ordered his release.1
Aside from the Court's immediate order pertaining to Mr.
Foucha, the decision left no clear holding. Justice O'Connor, while
concurring with the majority's decision in this case, wrote separately
to assert that a state may be able to confine an NMID insanity acquit-
tee if "the nature and duration of detention" were appropriately "tai-
lored., 42 More "narrowly drawn laws," Justice O'Connor argued, may
permit the incapacitation of an NMID insanity acquittee.n
All nine Foucha justices would prohibit post-sentence punitive in-S 44
carceraton. The majority, while forbidding confinement immedi-
ately following trial for dangerousness alone, added, directly on point
to the instant issue, "[t] he same would be true of any convicted crimi-
nal, even though he has completed his prison term. It would also be
only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness
for our present system .... , Justice Thomas, in his dissent, specifi-
cally addressed post-sentence confinement:
To acknowledge, as I do, that it is constitutionally permissible for a State
to provide for the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee who
remains dangerous is obviously quite different than to assert that the
State is allowed to confine anyone who is dangerous for as long as it
wishes.46
Nonetheless, the four dissenting Justices, who would permit the
state's confinement of a non-mentally ill insanity acquittee on the ba-
sis of his dangerousness alone,47 and Justice O'Connor, who would
have presumably joined their side in a case presenting a narrowly tai-
39 Id. at 75-77.
40 Id. at 80-83; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (emphasizing that the
duration of confinement is restricted by the "stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial
Act").
41 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
42 Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972) ("[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reason-
able relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.") (emphasis added).
4 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
44 Id. at 80, 82-83, 98-99, 101,122 n.16.
Id. at 82-83.
46 Id. at 122 n.16 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
47 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia joined justice Thomas's dissent. Id. at 102. Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote a separate dissenting opinion which ChiefJustice Rehnquist alsojoined. Id.
at 90-102.
Jan. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
lored confinement statute, could be expected to distinguish post-
sentence civil commitment. A clue as to their jurisprudence lies in
the majority opinion of Kansas v. Hendricks, where the same five jus-
tices ruled on the post-sentence commitment of sexually violent
predators. s
C. Sexually Violent Predator Commitment
To pass constitutional muster, a state's post-sentence confinement
for dangerousness alone would need to resemble the constitutionally-
valid post-sentence commitment of sexually violent predators
("SVP"). Since civil commitment and post-insanity acquittal cases are
both useful for delineating the constitutionally mandated criteria for
holding individuals outside of the traditional prison sentence setting,
the Court's analysis of post-sentence SVP commitment draws heavily
from Donaldson, Addington, Jones, and Foucha.
SVP statutes typically require a hearing following the expiration of
an offender's prison sentences to determine if the offender repre-
sents a continuing danger.48 If so found, the SVP is committed in-
definitely, subject to periodic review.
The nature of the offender's sexual abnormality facially distin-
guishes SVP commitments from the issue of general commitment for
dangerousness. However, since SVP commitments are designed for
dangerous offenders who do not have the type of mental disease or
50defect generally required by civil commitment statutes, they are ac-
tually rather similar. Thus, arguments concerning SVP commitments
are directly relevant to the constitutionality of commitment for dan-
gerousness alone.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court examined and upheld the consti-
tutionality of Kansas's SVP commitment systemi. 5' The Court analyzed
the case in terms of Addington and Foucha, finding that Hendricks's
52sexual deviance met the mental illness requirement of those cases.
48 521 U.S. 346, 349-70 (1997).
49 Such commitment processes exist in at least sixteen states and the District of Columbia.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701-36-3717 (2003); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6605
(West 1998 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-918 (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 901A.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.185-
253B.19 (2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001-103 (Vernon 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-71.09.902 (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.06 (West 1998).
50 See Steven J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Dis-
tinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69,
84-85 (1996) (discussing the appropriate uses of the civil system as a "gap-filler" for the dan-
gerous, though not mentally ill, in the traditional sense).
51 521 U.S. at 350.
52 Id. at 356-59.
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Thus, a casual reading of Hendricks, noting its mental illness re-
quirement, would seem to bar a more general post-sentence com-
mitment for dangerousness alone. Such a reading is supported by
the Court's statement that, "[a] finding of dangerousness, standing
alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify in-
definite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commit-
ment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with
the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or
'mental abnormality.' '5 3  The Court proceeded to state that
Hendricks's pedophilia qualified as a mental abnormality.54
Despite this ostensible obstacle, a deeper analysis might reveal
otherwise: any dangerous recidivist might be committed under the
Hendricks logic.55 The Kansas statutory definition of a mental abnor-
mality which permits commitment is "a 'congenital or acquired con-
dition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predis-
poses the person to commit sexually violent offenses .... ,,,56 A
congenital or acquired condition, indubitably, is any condition (one
is either born with a condition or develops it later). Likewise, cogni-
tive and volitional capacities are every capacity. Kansas's SVP mental
abnormality definition should therefore read, "a condition which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses," or more
concisely, "a predisposition to commit sexually violent offenses."
Similarly, the Kansas statute that permits the commitment of "any
person... who suffers from a mental abnormalit... which makes
the person likely to engage in... sexual violence, 5 might read, "any
person ... who suffers from a predisposition to commit sexually vio-
lent offenses ... which makes the person likely to engage in sexual
violence," or more concisely, "any person ... likely to engage in sex-
ual violence."
The statute amounts merely to the commitment of sex crime re-
cidivists. If this logic seems tortured, one need only look to the legis-
lative findings: "' [A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexu-
ally violent predators exist who .... [are] likely to engage in sexually
violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent
53 Id. at 358 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
366 (1986); and Minnesota exrel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940)).
54 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
See Stephen J. Morse, Bad or Mad?: Sex Offenders and Social Control, in PROTECTING SOCIETY
FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 165, 176 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds.,
2003) (explaining that although the Kansas statute upheld in Hendricks subjects to civil com-
mitment sexual predators whose behavior is caused by a "mental abnormality," a closer look shows
that "mental abnormality" is "simply a description of the causation of any behavior").
56 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)).
57 Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)).
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predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual
violence is high.'
5 8
When one views pedophiles as a class, they do not appear inher-
ently more blameworthy or more essential to incapacitate than other
specific classes of violent criminals. Recidivist murderers, for exam-
ple, have no greater claim to the streets following their prison sen-
tence than pedophiles.59  The mental abnormality requirement,
therefore, ought easily to extend from sexual recidivists to generally
violent recidivists. Many, if not all, violent recidivists probably display
characteristics such as "failure to conform to social norms with re-
spect to lawful behaviors,. . . deceitfulness, .. . reckless disregard for
safety of self or others[J,] ... [and] consistent irresponsibility,"6 °
thereby falling into the category of mental abnormality that the psy-
chiatric community labels Antisocial Personality Disorder ("ASPD"),
if not a more serious psychiatric illness.61
Thus the constitutional "door" is left slightly ajar: if recidivists are
classified as suffering from the "mental abnormality" of ASPD, the
Hendricks logic may permit their commitment. The Court's majority
opinion comes close to admitting this logical extension: "It thus can-
not be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited sub-
class of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of or-
dered liberty.,
62
58 Id. at 351 (alteration in original) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
59 Of course, recidivist murderers are not likely to see the streets again. Sexually violent
predators, by contrast, may be the fortuitous beneficiaries of "improvident plea bargain[s]."
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (KennedyJ., concurring).
However, as Justice Kennedy points out, it is not the role of the civil commitment system "to
impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal
side...." Id.
Moreover, it is improbable that sexually violent predators are the only dangerous criminals
in need of further incapacitation. A Department of Justice study that surveyed more than two-
thirds of all prisoners released from prison in 1994 found that, in the three years following their
release, 1.2% of murderers were re-arrested for homicide and 16.7% of murderers were re-
arrested for any violent crime. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVIDJ. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 at 9 (2002) (tracking 272,111 offenders for three
years following their release). A similar survey of sex offenders released in 1994 revealed that
sex offenders are only slightly more prone to recidivism than the general population of released
prisoners. See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/rsorp94.pdf (tracking 9,691 male sex offenders, more than two-thirds of all sex offenders
released that year, for three years following their release from state prisons in 1994). Of the sex
offenders released, 5.3% were re-arrested for a sex offense during the three-year period after
their release. Id. at 30. During the same period, 17.1% of sex offenders were re-arrested for
any violent crime. Id. at 40.6O
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, QUICK REFERENCE TO THE DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-IV-TR
291-92 (2000) (describing Antisocial Personality Disorder).
61 See id. (describing the symptoms for a range of psychiatric disorders).
62 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. Justice Thomas, the author of the Hendricks opinion, also wrote
the Foucha dissent, in which he would have permitted post-insanity acquittal commitment for
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Such a reading may have prompted the Court's retreat six years
later in Kansas v. Crane, when the Court required a volitional defect
for Kansas to commit an SVp. 63 This volitional requirement may have
been specifically added to (or discovered in) the Hendricks logic to
inhibit the commitment of general recidivists. Nonetheless, despite
Justice Scalia's vociferous and cogent dissent that neither the Consti-
tution nor Hendricks requires a volitional prong,64 Crane's volitional
requirement adds little. Any recidivist lacks, or at least can be said to
lack, the ability to control himself. 65 Thus, Crane does not close the
constitutional "door" opened by Hendricks for the commitment of vio-
lent recidivists, including non-mentally ill, but dangerous offenders.66
D. Constitutional Conclusion
Donaldson and Addington appear to have set the constitutional cri-
teria for civil commitment: mental illness and dangerousness. This
author argues that this is a misreading of these cases. In any event,
their progeny display their declining relevance. Jones and Foucha pre-
pare the jurisprudence for commitment for dangerousness alone.
Hendricks and Crane very nearly approach the possibility. It is not im-
plausible to foresee an expansion from Hendricks to general post-
sentence commitment for dangerousness alone.
III. A RECONCILIATION OF PUNISHMENT THEORIES
Even if there is a narrow opening in the constitutional jurispru-
dence that would permit the post-sentence civil commitment of dan-
gerous offenders, such a system would likely be socially unpalatable.
Commitment for dangerousness alone would raise broad objections,
evoking images of "Big Brother, or Minority Report,68 in which per-
dangerousness alone. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A State may rea-
sonably decide that the integrity of an insanity-acquittal scheme requires the continued com-
mitment of insanity acquittees who remain dangerous.").
534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) ("We do not agree ... that the Constitution permits commit-
ment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-
control determination.").
64 See id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he notion that the Constitution requires in every
case a finding of 'difficulty if not impossibility' of control does not fit comfortably with the
broader holding of Hendricks .. ").
But see id. at 413 (stating that the lack of control "must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender... from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordi-
nary criminal case" (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58)).
See Morse, supra note 55, at 178 ("All people convicted of crime are potentially civilly com-
mittable according to the [Hendricks and Crane] logic.").
67 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950) (depicting a totalitarian state where Big Brother is al-
ways watching).
(I MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
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sons are arrested based on the prediction that they will commit a
crime in the future.
Parole is a superior alternative for incapacitating dangerous of-
fenders. 69 An offender should serve his deserved time as a determinate
minimum sentence. Following this term, he should become eligible
for parole. After his parole eligibility date, the justification for his in-
carceration becomes incapacitation; when he is no longer dangerous,
he should be released. Thus, the parole system permits an unconven-
tional view of punishment theory in which punishment justifications
are viewed consecutively instead of concurrently (mixed). Further-
more, such a parole system implements Professor Robinson's goal of
tying sentence duration to desert and subsequently incapacitating
dangerous offenders.7"
A. The Reality: Incarceration is Used for Incapacitation
Despite calls for a purely desert-based system of criminal punish-
ment, the criminal justice system is being used for incapacitation. At
least since the promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962, inca-S71
pacitation has been an accepted goal of punishment. Recidivist
statutes, such as three strikes laws, prove the law's aim of incapacita-
tion. Three strikes laws dramatically increase sentence length from
an individual crime's "deserved punishment. 72 In fact, any determi-
69 Parole and probation are frequently confused. Instead of a prison sentence, a judge may
order probation, where the offender remains "on the street" but is subject to a period of super-
vision. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). Parole, on the other hand, is the
supervised release of a prisoner before the completion of his sentence. See generally John H.
Lombardi, Parole, in CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 180-81
(Frank Schmalleger & Gordon M. Armstrong eds., 1997) (describing the parole process and the
reasons behind the parole system).
70 Professor Robinson would likely oppose a parole-based system because it departs from a
purely desert-based model of punishment. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1451 ("A system that
instead allows a subsequent reduction of sentence, as by a parole board, undercuts deserved
punishment."); Paul H. Robinson, Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson to the
Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3986, 3988 (Feb. 6,
1987) ("I have always applauded the Sentencing Reform Act's abolition of early release on pa-
role.., for this moves us toward honesty in sentencing.. ").
71 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining the general pur-
poses of punishment and attempting to merge, inter alia, incapacitation and desert). But see
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02, available at http://www.ali.org/forum6/MPCPD3.pdf
(Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004) (proposing a revised § 1.02, which would limit incapacitation to
the interior of the duration of deserved punishment). Since the 2004 draft has not yet been
considered by the Council or membership of the American Law Institute, it does not represent
the osition of the Institute.
R See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999) (requiring a life sentence for a
third felony conviction); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (2003) (requiring a life sentence for a
third conviction of fraud, petit larceny, or any felony); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
14 (2003) (affirming the constitutionality of California's three strikes law and stating that "Cali-
fornia's three strikes law reflects a shift in the State's sentencing policies toward incapacitating
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nate sentencing guidelines that rely on criminal history are plainly
structured by incapacitation. Prior criminal history is simply being
used as an indicator of dangerousness in order to predict necessary
sentence length.
Thus, the shift from punishment to prevention is not novel.7 4 Su-
preme Court jurisprudence has consistently accepted incapacitation
as a valid justification for criminal punishment.75  Prevention simply
continues the progression from pure retribution, when the death
penalty was imposed for all felonies, to the utilization of broader aims
of punishments.76
B. Reconciliation Using a Consecutive Punishment Justification
A shift to using post-sentence civil commitment for incapacitation,
as Professor Robinson proposes, is improbable. Incapacitation will
most likely continue to be achieved through imprisonment, despite
the injustice that sometimes results from such a practice. For in-
and deterring .. ") (emphasis added); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (affirming
the constitutionality of Texas's third-strike life sentence, where the Petitioner's third strike was
obtaining $120 by false pretenses).
If a sentence was purely retributive, everyone would get the same sentence for the same
crime. The fact that sentence duration varies according to prior criminal history indicates that
sentence duration is based, at least partly, on a different justification. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.1 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP4.pdf
(tying sentence length to prior criminal history); Pennsylvania Criminal Sentencing Guidelines,
204 PA. CODE §§ 303.4-303.8 (2004) (providing guidelines for determining sentence length
according to "prior record score").
Andrew Von Hirsch has suggested that a repeat offender "thumbs his nose" at the justice sys-
tem, and therefore retributively deserves a longer sentence. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 84-85 (1976) ("A first offense, in our view, is deserving
of less punishment than a second or third. ... [Riepetition alters the degree of culpability that
may be ascribed to the offender."). The added desert, however, cannot amount to more than a
minor enhancement in sentence duration. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1437 ("[Nlose-
thumbing may justify a minor portion of the dramatic increases imposed for a prior re-
cord ... "),
74 But see Robinson, supra note 2, at 1432 (suggesting that the shift from punishment to pre-
ventive detention of dangerous offenders has occurred only in the past decade).
75 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 379 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring
to Blackstone for the proposition that "incapacitation is one important purpose of criminal
punishment" (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *11-*12)); Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 99 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Incapacitation for the protection of society is
not an unusual ground for incarceration."); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968) (Black,J.,
concurring) ("[I1solation of the dangerous has always been considered an important function
of the criminal law.").
76 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) ("[Olne of the most signifi-
cant developments in our society's treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of
the common-law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted
of a specified offense."); see alsoJ. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 279
(1971) ("[P]enal theory at common law was very simple. Felony, with a few exceptions, at-
tracted the death penalty.").
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stance, there are numerous cases of seemingly undeserved third-
strike life sentences.7' These life sentences are imposed for the pur-
pose of preventing future crimes that will likely never occur because
the offender is so elderly or crippled that he simply cannot recidi-
vate.v7  At the opposite extreme, three strikes laws do nothing to inca-
pacitate even the most violent first or second-time offenders who
show all the signs of being likely recidivists, and from whom society
most needs protection.79
Though Professor Robinson cogently argues that punishment and
incapacitation must be wholly segregated, the reality is that incapaci-
tation through imprisonment is broadly accepted. But the two goals
can properly coexist when viewed consecutively, not concurrently.
If imprisonment is used for incapacitation, it should be done ac-
curately in order to be valid. If an offender is not dangerous, he
should be released immediately following his desert. Dangerous of-
fenders should, of course, remain incarcerated for the duration of
their sentence. The use of mandatory eligibility parole (but non-
mandatory release) can achieve this goal of incapacitation consecutive
to desert.
C. Un-blending Punishment Theories
The standard criminal law text explains each justification of pun-
ishment, then proceeds to state that most punishments are the result
of "mixed theories."0 However, in an indeterminate sentencing
scheme, with mandatory parole eligibility, the punishment justifica-
tions may be viewed as separate and sequential instead of mixed. The
77 See, e.g., BLOW (New Line Cinema 2001) (recounting the true story of a drug dealer going
straight and raising his daughter, only to be much later convicted of his third strike). See gener-
ally JOE DOMANICK, CRUEL JUSTICE: THREE STRIKES AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA'S
GOLDEN STATE (2004) (describing the deleterious effects of California's three strikes laws).
78 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 2, at 1451 (criticizing three strikes laws because they can
only be applied to career criminals who are generally at the age where recidivism is unlikely,
and finding that "[s]uch a scheme produces a costly prevention system of prisons full of geriat-
ric life-termers"); Torsten Ove, Growing Old in Prison, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Mar. 6, 2005,
at Al (using SCI Laurel Highlands, Pennsylvania's geriatric prison, to describe the challenges in
imprisoning elderly prisoners who are unlikely to recidivate, and to present the arguments for
and against continuing the practice).
This class of offenders includes young offenders upon conviction of their first crimes not
as minors. It also may include domestic batterers who have eluded a criminal history by con-
vincing their victims not to report the abuse to the police. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1450
n.78 ("[B]attering spouses are often able to persuade their victims not to press criminal
charges....").
80 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 5, at § 2.05 (describing the mixed theories of punishment
and the justifications given by scholars for having such a hybrid system); see also Robinson, supra
note 2, at 1442 (arguing that some "blended" or mixed theories of punishment deny that any
conflict exists between incapacitation and desert).
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initial portion of an offender's incarceration, prior to parole eligibil-
ity, should be viewed as his 'just deserts," or retribution."' Following
the time he "deserves," the offender should become eligible for pa-
role. Any time that he continues to serve is justified solely by inca-
pacitation.
Professor Robinson critically states that a "reduction of sentence,
as by a parole board, undercuts deserved punishment. 8 2  Parole
would not, however, undercut deserved punishment if an offender
becomes eligible for parole only after the conclusion of his desert.
Thus, indeterminate sentences, coupled with a paroling mechanism,
permit prison sentences to achieve both desert and incapacitation. 3
If punishment justifications are viewed consecutively, Professor
Robinson's quandary over the "former Nazi concentration camp offi-
84cial" is solved. The posited example is that the former official is an
elderly man and now a "productive member of society. 85 Under an
incapacitation model, he would "escape the punishment he deserves"
because there is now no need for incapacitation or rehabilitation.8
To the contrary, under a consecutive model of punishment, the for-
mer Nazi official would still receive the punishment he deserves, as it
would be served first (and presumably of very long duration) before
he might be entitled to parole.
Even if incapacitation can exist as a separate justification of pun-
ishment, it may still be contended that it should not. Professor Robin-
son argues that "distribut[ing] punishment according to predictions
of future dangerousness rather than blameworthiness for past crimes
can only undercut the system's moral credibility."'  Such moral
credibility, Professor Robinson explains, provides functionality to
criminal law. The law's credibility can stigmatize offenders, and the
fear of stigma will deter criminal acts.88 Furthermore, this permits the
81 See KANT, supra note 3, at 194-204 (arguing for an equalization of punishment with the
crime in order to allocate both the quality and quantity of ajust punishment).
82 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1451.
93 At least one study has found that decreasing prison term length does not affect recidivism
rates. See JOHN E. BERECOCHEA ET AL., CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. RESEARCH DIV., TIME SERVED IN
PRISON AND PAROLE OUTCOME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (REPORT No. I in RESEARCH REPORT
NO. 49) 25 (Oct. 1973) (finding no difference in the recidivism rates between a sample of 494
offenders who had their prison terms reduced, and a similar size control group whose terms
were not reduced). The study, however, was based on only a six-month reduction in prison
term.
84 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1438.
83 Id. at 1438 n.35.
86 Id. at 1438.
87 Id. at 1444.
88 Id. at 1443.
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law to condemn conduct that was not previously condemned and to
"shape community norms."89
The "work" of Professor Robinson's argument is accomplished by
its underlying axiom, that incapacitation deprives the system of its
moral credibility. The validity of this axiom appears to rest upon his
contention that an incapacitation-based system is unjust in that it in-
tentionally assigns punishment inaccurately.90 This is true when con-
sidering the geriatric third-striker or the Nazi official escaping prison.
The system will, however, maintain its moral credibility if the sen-
tence requires a period of desert followed by a well-understood and
fairly-determined parole system. 9'
In fact, Professor Robinson's proposal for post-sentence commit-
ment acknowledges the validity of incapacitation following desert.
Both this author and Professor Robinson are concerned that the cur-
rent criminal justice system incapacitates for a duration greater than
desert. Though Professor Robinson's proposal for post-sentence civil
commitment would successfully segregate incapacitation and pro-
mote accurate sentence duration, it is constitutionally questionable.
Instead, parole permits incapacitation to be provided within the cur-
rent incarceration system. Incarceration duration would be the same
as in Professor Robinson's proposal, but the constitutionality would
not be in doubt." Therefore, integration of punishment and inca-
pacitation is the preferred option.93
IV. PAROLE FUNCTIONING AS PREVENTIVE RESTRAINT
The history of parole in the United States dates back more than a
century.9 4  New York initiated an indeterminate sentencing scheme
89 Id.
90 Paul H. Robinson, The Provost's Lecture Series at the University of Pennsylvania: Does
Giving People the Punishment They Deserve Help Reduce Crime? (Jan. 27, 2005).
91 In addition, that period of incapacitating parole may be served under the theory of mini-
mum restraint. For example, the parole period might be served under house arrest, by elec-
tronic ankle "bracelet," or perhaps under supervision of a parole officer. In short, the proposal
is for a well-tailored parole.
92 It may be argued that the punitive sentence duration is shorter in Professor Robinson's
proposal, where prison time would be followed by civil commitment. It is doubtful, however,
that the civil commitment would be meaningfully less punitive than low-security prison. See
Morse, supra note 12, at 1026 n.5 ("I can see little reason to believe, however, that allegedly
beneficial 'protections' of indefinite civil commitment would effectively protect liberty.... For
example, ... I doubt that many courts would be likely to find means less intrusive than con-
finement sufficient to protect the public from criminals with a history of sexual violence.").
93 But see Robinson, supra note 2, at 1432 ("Segregation of the punishment and prevention
functions offers a superior alternative.").
94 See generally EDWARD E. RHINE ET AL., PAROLING AUTHORITIES: RECENT HISTORY AND
CuRRENT PRACTICE 5-26 (1991) (describing the development of the parole system in the
United States from the 1840's through the 1980's).
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and parole board in 1889."5 In Massachusetts, parole is traced to the
opening of its first "modern" reformatory in 1884.96 The manual
given to prisoners of the Massachusetts Reformatory provided: "In
deserving cases, however, where it can be reasonably assumed that a
man will be better off outside of the reformatory, he may be given the
privilege of parole . . .9' In Illinois, parole dates to its pre-statehood
period (pre-1818), when the President of the United States effectively
granted parole by employing conditional pardons.9
More than seventy years ago, a study of the parole system of Mas-
sachusetts found that forty-three percent of parolees had their parole
revoked for "violation of the conditions of parole, or. . . because of
new crimes."99 By 1950, accuracy in parole determinations was recog-
nized as critical: "One of the most crucial problems of the entire in-
stitutional program is the determination of when the inmate's return
to society will be safe for the public and desirable for his welfare." '1°0
Current parole decision making methods include non-discretionary
methods, such as mandatory release at a date determined at the
original sentencing, and discretionary methods, such as judgment-
based (clinical) and guideline-based (actuarial) decisions. Under all
parole methodologies, accuracy in assessing danger and recidivism
remains a crucial problem.01
While all fifty states had parole systems by the mid-twentieth cen-102 0,3- • ,1-
tury,10 2 the "tough on crime and "truth in sentencing " °4 movement
95 See STATE OF N.Y., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF PAROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT 10 (1931) (detailing the historical use of indeterminate sentencing and parole in
New York state).
96 See SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS 25 (1930) (noting
the opening of the Massachusetts Reformatory in 1884 and discussing the goals of the Reforma-
tory to "discipline, instruct, enlighten, qualify, and equip the offender, so that he will not again
have the desire or necessity for wrongdoing").
97 Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
98 See Andrew A. Bruce, The History and Development of the Parole System in Illinois, in THE
WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 1, 9
(1928) (describing the types of pardoning powers the State of Illinois vested in the President of
the United States, who had the exclusive right to grant pardons under Illinois state law).
99 GLUECK & GLUECK, supra note 96, at 167.
100 COMM. ON CLASSIFICATION & CASEWORK OF THE AM. PRISON ASS'N, HANDBOOK ON PRE-
RELEASE PREPARATION IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 16 (1950) (recommending preparations
for release to parole so that parolees do not recidivate).
In 1979, 24.9% of new crimes were committed by "avertable recidivists," offenders who
would still have been in prison but for parole. DEANJ. CHAMPION, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN
THE UNITED STATES 209 tbl.6.1 (1990). This number underrepresents the extent of the inaccu-
racy because it fails to account for false negatives (offenders who could have been safely re-
leased). In 1999, 58% of state parolees failed to successfully complete their terms of supervi-
sion, and in 1997, 70% of parole violators returned to prison for committing a new offense.
TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000, at 10,
14 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tspOO.pdf.
102 CHAMPION, supra note 101, at 120.
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of the Reagan era has reduced the utilization of parole systems. If
used correctly and accurately, however, parole can reconcile the pun-
ishment justifications of incapacitation and desert, as well as capture
and improve the benefits of post-sentence civil commitment. To
meet these aims, two conditions must be fulfilled: first, parole eligibil-
ity must be tied to desert; second, parole release must be tied to non-
dangerousness.
A. Mandatory Parole Release
In 1927, mandatory parole release was already criticized in a sur-
vey of several parole systems published by the Pennsylvania State Pa-
role Commission:
Other parole boards release everybody [,] ... [and] the parole law be-
comes an automatic reduction of all sentences, a thing which is even
worse, perhaps, because it gives liberty without reference to fitness for
liberty and reduces the period during which stone and steel guarantee
society protection from those who endanger its peace.105
Today, sixteen states and the federal government have either en-
tirely abolished their parole systems or created mandatory parole re-
lease mechanisms.10 6 Parole release dates are pre-determined by vari-
ous methods, including mandatory serving of half of the sentence
length, or deferring to the judge's danger assessment intuition.
10 7
The first condition, tying parole eligibility to desert, can be fulfilled
where the parole eligibility date is matched to the period of desert."",
Fully determinate sentences and mandatory parole release, how-
ever, both neglect the second condition, because they fail to tie pa-
role release to non-dangerousness. In Pennsylvania, for example, of-
fenders receiving sentences of fewer than two years are automatically
paroled at the completion of half of their sentence.' 9 Such a system
103 See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, Reagan, Lobbying for Bork, Calls Judge Tough on Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1987, at A6 (reporting on Reagan's heralding of his nomination to the Su-
preme Court as "tough, clear-eyed").
104 See, e.g., New York's Unfinished Business; Still Time for Truth in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 1985, at A26 (calling for determinate sentencing in New York State).
105 GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM, NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS PROBATION AND PAROLE 133 (1931) (quoting CLAIR WILCOX, PA. STATE
PAROLE COMM'N, SURVEY OF PAROLE ADMINISTRATION (1927)).
106 See, e.g., Parole Commission Phaseout Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18 (2000) (abolish-
in the federal parole system).
See HUGHES ET. AL., supra note 101, at 2 (describing the rise in the number of states using
determinate sentencing and mandatory supervised releases instead of discretionary parole).
108 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 454
(1997) (arguing that penal codes drafted to comport sentence length with desert are morally
superior).
9 See 61 PA. STAT. § 316 (2005) ("Any convict serving any sentence in a State penitentiary,
the minimum of which sentence exceeds one-half the maximum sentence, shall be eligible to
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is inherently flawed because it releases the offender without regard to
his danger. Not surprisingly, successful parole completion is much
lower under mandatory parole release systems than discretionary pa-
role systems." °
B. Discretionary Parole Release
The other thirty-four states utilize discretionary parole release
mechanisms. Unlike mandatory parole release, discretionary systems
allow a parole board to assess danger before making a parole deci-
sion. Such systems can, but do not always, reconcile desert and inca-
pacitation. The first condition can be met by a clearly defined parole
eligibility date that is set to an offender's deserved punishment.
Following the date of parole eligibility, the offender's dangerous-
ness should be assessed. The basis of any clinical judgment or actuar-
ial decision making is risk assessment: is the offender safe for the
streets? Such a prediction is inherently difficult and has been widely
questioned."' However, a prima facie dismissal is unwarranted.' 2
Methods have been developed to more reliably and validly estimate
dangerousness." 3  Such methods include judgment-based (clinical)
and guideline-based (actuarial) systems.
apply for release on parole, under present existing parole laws or any hereinafter passed, when
said convict has served or will have served one-half of the maximum sentence thereof."); see also
61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 331.17 (West 1999) (providing for state parole board supervision of offend-
ers sentenced to terms of at least two years).
110 See HUGHES ET. AL., supra note 101, at 11 ("Among parole discharges in 1999, 54% of dis-
cretionary parolees were successful compared to 33% of those who had received mandatory
parole.").
I See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 938 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In view
of the total scientific groundlessness of these predictions [of future violence], psychiatric testi-
mony is fatally misleading."); Robinson, supra note 2, at 1450 ("A scientist's ability to predict
future criminality using all available data is poor. ").
12 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("As we have recognized, '[p]revious
instances of violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies.'" (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993))); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention
and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 543-44 (1986)
(arguing that critics' assessments of prediction capability are flawed in their failure to distin-
guish non-difficult cases, but arguing that it would be inappropriate to characterize all unveri-
fied predictions as wrong). Professor Alscbuler writes, "[a] lthough predicting the weather is a
difficult task, almost anyone can do it when a funnel cloud is headed in his direction." Id. at
544.
113 See generally JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MAcARTHUR
STUDY OF MENTAL DISEASE AND VIOLENCE (2001) (reviewing the MacArthur Violence Risk As-
sessment Study, a ten-year study based on 134 actuarially-derived variables and a risk assessment
tool with a 76% true positive rate); VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING
AND MANAGING RISK (1998) (assessing the use of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide ("VRAG"),
an actuarial "cookbook" for predicting violence); Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster,
The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders,
26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3 (1999) (assessing the validity of the Historical, Clinical, and Risk
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1. Judgment-Based (Clinical) Parole Release
As of 1991, among states with a discretionary parole system, all but
nine were making release decisions by clinical judgment.114 Unlike
mandatory parole release, discretionary systems allow a parole board
to assess the potential for danger before making a parole decision.
While some parole boards are guided purely by discretion, others are
steered by statutorily defined criteria. Such criteria, typically based
on lay intuitions of violence prediction, generally comport with scien-
tifically known violence predictors.15
Even so, accuracy remains a problem. For example, in Pennsyl-
vania's state prison parole release program (for offenders serving
more than two years), which is based on clinical judgment, approxi-
mately one in two parolees is recommitted." 6 Furthermore, such sta-
tistics underrepresent the extent of the inaccuracy in parole decisions
because they fail to account for the false negatives: those denied pa-
role who could have been safely released, and those who re-offend
but are not caught. Of the 8,365 prisoners denied parole in Pennsyl-
vania during 2004,17 at least some, if not a high percentage, could
have been safely paroled. These false negatives are expensive, be-
cause each one represents another warehoused body which must be
fed and sheltered. Still, parole boards err on the side of safety, possi-
bly to avoid political backlash from a high-profile wrong decision
(false positive).
Management (HCR-20) violence risk assessment scheme, a structured clinical interview that is
scored actuarially); Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The
Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 315 (1993) (describing
the initial development of the VRAG as a method for using statistical or actuarial methods to
predict recidivism).
14 See RHINE, supra note 94, at 67 (noting that only nine states use statistical or actuarial ta-
bles, referred to as "grid guidelines," while the remainder relied more on "guiding principles").
115 See, e.g., 61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 331.19 (West 1999) (setting criteria for the parole board to
consider, including "the nature and circumstances of the offense committed[,] ... the conduct
of the person while in prison[,] ... his physical, mental and behavior condition[,] ... his his-
tory of family violence [,] and his complete criminal record").
116 See COMMONWEALTH OF PA., BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONTHLY PROGRAM REPORT tbls.2 &
7 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.pbpp.state.pa.us/pbpp/lib/pbppinfo/stats/2004-12
MonthlyProgramReport.pdf (reporting 825 newly paroled prisoners and 466 recommitted);
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONTHLY PROGRAM REPORT tbls.2 & 7 (Nov.
2004), available at http://www.pbpp.state.pa.us/pbpp/lib/pbppinfo/stats/2004-1 1-Monthly-
ProgramReport.pdf (reporting 855 newly paroled prisoners and 348 recommitted);
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONTHLY PROGRAM REPORT tbls.2 & 7 (Oct.
2004), available at http://www.pbpp.state.pa.us/pbpp/lib/pbppinfo/stats/2004_10_Monthly.
ProgramReport.pdf (reporting 766 newly paroled prisoners and 478 recommitted).
117 COMMONWEALTH OF PA., BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONTHLY PROGRAM REPORT tbl.8 (Dec.




2. Guideline-Based (Actuarial) Parole Release
In Illinois, there were early attempts at creating actuarial (non-
clinical) parole guidelines. Published in 1928, one study evaluated
the use of twenty-two characteristics, and attempted to harness their
relative weights to guide the parole board.""8 The author's early, yet
sagacious, conclusion is worthy of note:
Do not these striking differences, which correspond with what we already
know about the conditions that mould the life of the person, suggest that
they be taken more seriously and objectively into account than previ-
ously? These factors have, of course, been considered, but in a common-
sense way so that some one or two of them have been emphasized out of• . 119
all proportion to their significance.
More than fifty years later, the U.S. Parole Commission requested the
help of scientists to develop a modern actuarial parole system. 20 In
1973, their recommended guidelines were formally adopted to pre-
dict "parole prognosis" (likelihood of successful parole) by assessing
underlying offense severity as well as an offender profile, known as a
Salient Factor Score ("SFS"). The SFS was revised in 1976121 and
again in 1981. SFS 81, as the test is known, is a simple, yet fairly reli-
11 The following were the twenty-two factors considered as indications of the future success
or failure of parole:
(1) nature of offense; (2) number of associates in committing offense for which con-
victed; (3) nationality of the inmate's father; (4) parental status, including broken
homes; (5) marital status of the inmate; (6) type of criminal, as first offender, occasional
offender, habitual offender, professional criminal; (7) social type, as ne'er-do-well, gang-
ster, hobo; (8) county from which committed; (9) size of community; (10) type of
neighborhood; (11) resident or transient in community when arrested; (12) statement of
trial judge and prosecuting attorney with reference to recommendation for or against
leniency; (13) whether or not commitment was upon acceptance of lesser plea; (14) na-
ture and length of sentence imposed; (15) months of sentence actually served before pa-
role; (16) previous criminal record of the prisoner; (17) his previous work record; (18)
his punishment record in the institution; (19) his age at time of parole; (20) his mental
age according to psychiatric examination; (21) his personality type according to psychi-
atric examination; and (22) psychiatric prognosis.
Ernest W. Burgess, Factors Determining Success or Failure on Parole, in THE WORKINGS OF THE
INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS, supra note 98, at 203, 221.
119 Id. at 246; see also WICKERSHAM, supra note 105, at 135 ("Little attention is yet given in
many States to a scientific selection of prisoners for parole release .... Too little use is made of
psychological and psychiatric tests .... ).
20 See DON M. GOTffREDSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PAROLE DECISION MAKING: THE
UTILIzATION OF EXPERIENCE IN PAROLE DECISION MAKING: A PROGRESS REPORT 1 (1973) (de-
scribing the efforts to enhance the parole decision making process through the use of com-
puter technology to analyze statistical data in order to assist parole boards and other decision
points in the criminal justice field).
121 See Federal Parole Guidelines, 42 Fed. Reg. 31, 785-86 (June 23, 1977) (announcing de-
terminate federal parole guidelines based on the "salient factor score" and offense characteris-
tics).
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able and valid predictor of parole success.12  More recent actuarialdevices have used SFS 81 as a basis or guide. 123
C. Applying Parole Mechanisms to Punishment Theory
While danger prediction in all systems remains difficult, a predic-
tion of the distant future is logically more difficult than a prediction
of the immediate. Fully determinate sentences are "highly inappro-
priate for effective prevention' 24 because judges cannot effectively
determine duration of dangerousness ex-ante ("After how many years
of incapacitation will he cease to be dangerous?"). A discretionary
parole board's prediction of the immediate ("Will he be dangerous if
released tomorrow?") can be more accurate. Thus, paroling systems
increase prediction ability by shifting the occasion of the danger as-
sessment.
Even where predictions are impossible, the use of parole as a
mechanism for incapacitating is superior to current attempts to use
incarceration for incapacitation, such as disproportionately long sen-
tences or recidivist statutes. With a discretionary parole system, an
offender assessed to be a clear continuing danger will remain incar-
cerated. If the assessment is equivocal, the state can err towards cau-
tion by not releasing him. In both of these cases, the result is the
same as in a system without parole: incapacitation is provided by
lengthy sentences.
If, however, an offender is clearly not a danger to society, parole
provides a mechanism for his release. This parole option, even if
only used in relatively few cases, represents an advantage over pre-
determined sentences.
A properly designed parole mechanism captures the benefits of
Professor Robinson's proposal for post-sentence civil commitment.
12 5
First, parole permits periodic review, allowing release to be tied to
non-dangerousness. Second, although post-sentence commitment
would be served in the less punitive conditions of civil commitment, it
is difficult to imagine that a facility could be devised for violent re-
122 See Peter B. Hoffman, Screening for Risk: A Revised Salient Factor Score (SFS 81), 11 J. CRIM.
JUST. 539 (reporting, as a member of the U.S. Parole Commission, on the development, reliabil-
ity, and validity of the SFS 81). The SFS 81 scores the following: prior convictions; prior com-
mitments of more than thirty days; age at current offense; recent commitment-free period;
whether the offender was a parolee, probationer, confined, or escapee at the time of the cur-
rent offense; and heroin or opiate dependence. Id. at 546.
123 See CHAMPION, supra note 101, at 154 (describing how the SFS 81 is used to determine pa-
role prognosis); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.165 (West 2001) (mandating the use of salient
factor scores in the development of objective parole guidelines).
124 Robinson, supra note 2, at 1452.




cidivists that is less punitive than a low- or medium-security prison.
Next, parole also permits the possibility of minimal restraint: house
arrest, ankle bracelets, or other alternatives. Unlike post-sentence
civil commitment, the institutional framework is already in place for
such techniques. Finally, a parole system does not necessarily inhibit
mental health treatment.
Thus, a discretionary parole release system is at least as good as
the proposed post-sentence civil commitment system. In fact, a prop-
erly-designed parole system is superior to post-sentence civil com-
mitment because there is no constitutional objection. 116  Using a
guideline-based (actuarial) parole release mechanism will provide a
clear statement to the public of predictable sentence formulation,
preserving the system's moral authority. 127 In addition, if prisoners
know the exact release guidelines, they will have incentives to work
towards their own release while still in prison.
D. Incentive Theories
Instead of Wizard of Oz129 parole decision making, where parole
board members retreat behind a curtain only to emerge at some later
date with a decision, 13 a determinate and publicly known parole sys-
tem should be implemented. A parole system according to determi-
nate guidelines will provide an incentive for incarcerated offenders to
meet its requirements. Offenders will know what it takes to be re-
leased from incarceration.
The failure of the SFS 81 is its lack of attention to behavior and
performance during incarceration. Though at least one study has
126 See, e.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987) (finding that Montana's statu-
tory framework created a liberty interest because of a presumption in favor of parole release).
27 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 474 (discussing the criminal law's power as a
moral authority).
128 There are other well known, albeit debatable, benefits of a parole system. These include
the reintegration of parolees into society and the decreasing of the prison population. See
CHAMPION, supra note 101, at 20-23 (describing the primary functions of parole: crime control,
community reintegrations, punishment, and deterrence).
19 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
Io See HARRY E. ALLEN ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN AMERICA 99 (1985) ("[T]here is
nothing more cruel, inhumane, and frustrating than serving a prison term without knowledge
of what will be measured and what rules determine release readiness." (citing Everette M. Por-
ter, Criteria for Parole Selection, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF
CORRECTION OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION 227 (1958))); FREDERICK A. HUSSEY
& DAVID E. DUFFEE, PROBATION, PAROLE, AND COMMUNITY FIELD SERVICES: POLICY, STRUCTURE,
AND PROCESS 137 (1980) ("The fact that inmates do not really know what a parole board may
consider important, coupled with the brief encounters they are likely to have with the board,
puts a tremendous strain on inmates who are probably not very accomplished at presenting
themselves verbally."); RHINE, supra note 94, at 23 ("[Plarole release decision making was arbi-
trary and unfair, secretive, not subject to review and thus, inherently flawed.").
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called for the inclusion of deleterious conduct during the incarcera-
tion period,13 ' and some parole risk assessments incorporate pre-
incarceration social factors,3 2 few, if any, determinate parole risk as-
sessments incorporate in-prison positive social factors.
For example, tying parole release to participation in prison educa-
tional or job training should create a desirable and nicely circular re-
sult: educated and trained offenders will be statistically less danger-
ous upon release and they may be released earlier because they will
be less dangerous. 33 Today there are only twelve college degree pro-
grams for prisoners in the United States. 3 The money saved by pa-
roling educated, non-dangerous offenders following their desert
could be used to create additional programs.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Robinson convincingly argues, desert should be seg-
regated from incapacitation. He proposes that offenders should
serve their deserved sentences and then be held in post-sentence civil
commitment only as long as necessary to protect society. Indefinite
post-sentence civil commitment, however, raises serious constitutional
questions. In addition, such a system fails to conform with American




131 See Michael R. Gottfredson & Kenneth Adams, Prison Behavior and Release Performance: Em-
pirical Reality and Public Policy, 4 L. & POLY Q. 373, 379 (1982) (studying the use of assaultive
infractions, escape history, and prison punishment in assessing parole success).
132 See, e.g., RHINE, supra note 94, at 180-83 (reprinting the State of Minnesota Assessment of
Client Risk factors, which incorporate substance abuse problems and employment history into
parole risk assessment, as well as the Maine Adult Caseload Management System factors, which
assess risk by evaluating severity of instant offense, prior record, education, occupation, sub-
stance abuse, living arrangements, residence, and mental stability).
133 In 1931, New York's report on parole already stated: "Penal institutions must be schools
of industry and training in the responsibilities of right living.. .. " STATE OF N.Y., supra note 95,
at 19.
134 See, e.g., Ian Buruma, Uncaptive Minds: What Teaching a College-Level Class at a Maximum-
Security Correctional Facility Did for the Inmates-and for Me, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 20, 2005, at 38
(noting the decline in higher education programs for prisoners in the 1990s, but describing
positive experiences that the author had in teaching and the prisoners had in attending a col-
lege course inside a prison).
135 Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Men-
tally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54, 54 (1982); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.");Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) ("It is clear that
'commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection.'" (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979))). But see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) ("Although freedom from physical restraint 'has always
been at the core of the liberty...' that liberty interest is not absolute. The Court has recog-
nized that an individual's constitutionally protected interest... may be overridden even in the
civil context...." (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))).
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Today, many offenders receive life or otherwise lengthy sentences,
not for desert, but as "a particularly crude form of consequentialism"
to ensure that dangerous offenders remain incapacitated.136 It is
widely agreed that all offenders should serve their just deserts. Fol-
lowing that initial period, however, if an offender is clearly safe for
release, instead of suffering unnecessary incapacitation, he should
have the opportunity to be granted parole. Thus, a parole mecha-
nism can ensure desert while also fulfilling the aim of incapacitating
dangerous prisoners.
Furthermore, the legal and institutional framework for parole is
already in place and there is no constitutional objection. There is
even a well-established regular review mechanism. Despite protests to
the contrary,3 7 the criminal justice system, by way of parole, is an ef-
fective "vehicle" to achieve incapacitation.
136 Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 38
(2003-2004) (describing the failure of the state criminal justice systems that engage in "quaran-
tine schemes" or purely preventative detention).
157 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1432 (describing the criminal justice system as the wrong
vehicle" for incapacitation).
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